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Nina Totenberg, legal correspondent 
for National Public Radio 
Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Wisconsin 
Supreme Court 
Judge Patricia Wald, Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia 
Jesse H. Choper, Dean, Boalt Hall 
School of Law, University of California, 
Berkeley 
John Hart Ely, Dean, Stanford Univer-
sity School of Law 
The Constitutional Law Panel of the NA W J brought to-
gether distinguished theoreticians and practitioners of judicial 
review. Deans Choper and Ely presented abbreviated versions of 
their recently published theories* on the legitimacy of judicial 
review in a democratic society. Justice Abrahamson and Judge 
Wald responded with observations on the practical applications 
of state and federal constitutional principles to the cases they 
must adjudicate daily. 
Deans Ely and Choper both contend that there is an inher-
ent dissonance between our democratic form of representative 
government and the power of the Supreme Court to overturn 
legislation or adjudicate conflicts between the political branches. 
As a totally appointed body, the Supreme Court is not by defini-
tion politically responsible and ought to confine itself to safe-
guarding the rights and interests of those groups who are not 
well represented in the electoral process-minorities and the po-
litically and economically disadvantaged. 
Dean Choper would have the Supreme Court deny review of 
all claims based on federalism. He sees no need for review of 
federal statutes which allegedly violate states' rights because 
state interests are adequately represented by Congress which 
created the disputed legislation. Likewise, Dean Choper would 
* J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980). 
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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not have the Supreme Court act as a referee in power struggles 
between Congress and the President. Both political entities are 
adequately armed to defend against the other's invasion of its 
prerogatives. 
The proper exercise of judicial reVIew by the Supreme 
Court, according to Dean Choper, is in the area of individual 
rights, where the Court must act to preserve and protect the 
rights of the under-represented. Analogously, Dean Choper 
urges judicial review where the executive or legislative branches 
seek to curtail the power of the courts. Because the federal 
courts are also outside the electoral process and therefore not 
represented, they must be allowed to guard against incursions 
into their proper authority by the other branches. 
Dean Ely perceives the evolution of constitutional law since 
Reconstruction as having had one basic theme: extending fuller 
and more equal participation in the political process to previ-
ously unrepresented groups. The Supreme Court's sole legiti-
mate function according to this thesis is to assure that govern-
ment does not so exercise its majoritarian mandate as to 
discriminate arbitrarily or invidiously against minorities. 
Since the basis of individual rights' protection is derived 
from somewhat inchoate constitutional language-the Equal 
Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the 14th 
Amendment, for example-the most important and burdensome 
task of the Supreme Court is to give content to the words of the 
document. There have been two traditional approaches to the 
problem of constitutional interpretation: one would look to the 
intent of the Framers and limit the operation of the document 
to its eighteenth century mandate; the other would identify 
traditional socio-political values and seek to uphold them by ex-
tending constitutional protection to rights and values so identi-
fied. Dean Ely sees both these approaches as offensive to the 
democratic ideal, the former because it delegates power to per-
sons long-since dead and the latter because it is too vulnerable 
to the individual biases of judges. Instead, he proposes a middle 
ground between strict and broad construction that is basically 
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an elaboration of the Carolene Products· footnote, to wit, courts 
must protect the politically disadvantaged against oppression by 
the majority. When the court exercises judicial review in the 
context of individual rights, its anti-democratic quality is mini-
mized. Full and equal participation for minorities cannot be en-
trusted to elected officials since it may be in their self-interest to 
keep certain groups out of the political process, opening up the 
possibility of discrimination by electoral mandate. 
Justice Abrahamson and Judge Wald made the following re-
marks in response to Deans Ely and Choper's presentations. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW - THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY AND CERTAINTY 
(NOTES FROM THE TRENCHES) 
Judge Patricia Wald, Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia 
I 
I will begin by being perfectly honest with you. I don't lay 
claim to any scholarly background in this field. I don't even hail 
from academia. I did, however, spend a week or two at the end 
of the summer in a more or less hit-or-miss foray into the vast 
literature of judicial review, including Dean Ely's and Dean 
Choper's writings (some of them). I can't pretend to have ab-
sorbed it all; I felt somewhat like the bar mitzvah boy in the 
shul with the Talmudic scholars. At times, I was reminded of 
Herman Wouk's comment about the U.S. Navy-judicial review 
must be "a system designed by geniuses to be carried out by 
idiots." I do not suggest we judges are idiots, but I do admit that 
in deciding several hundred cases a year-even for us appellate 
types-(1) we don't get time to keep as current as perhaps we 
should with the law reviewers and jurisprudential thinkers; and 
(2) we probably don't have enough time on each case to figure 
out how to apply the theories, even if we could decide which 
ones to accept or reject. It may be, as the con man hero of The 
Music Man preached (I confess, in my spare time I often go to 
the movies instead of reading law reviews), you just have to 
think "restraint" or "norms" or "interpretativist" or "processed-
1. u.s. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 nA (1938). 
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based" values, and the music will come out right, but I'm 
dubious. 
I am not being altogether cute about this nor-God 
knows-contemptuous of the very considerable creativity that is 
encapsuled in these various theories of the proper functions and 
scope of judicial review. I also believe the exercise has a worth-
while by-product as a counter to the periodic-and not always 
intellectually honest-tirades about judicial restraint and judi-
cial activism that pepper our politics and do affect individual 
judge's selections, evaluations, and perhaps, in elective states, 
. even tenure. At a more profound level, any institution including 
the judiciary should always be concerned with the legitimacy of 
its actions and the framework within which it properly func-
tions, particularly in a democracy. 
I do believe, however, that the jurisprudence of judicial re-
view is formidable, and I think, in its present form, not very sus-
ceptible to immediate application by practicing judges (at least 
not on the so-called "inferior" courts which all of us inhabit). I 
will quote you one paragraph as an illustration, not for the valid-
ity of its remarks, certainly, but only to illustrate the diversity 
and elusiveness of the guidelines we are called upon to imple-
ment in our decisions: 
Professor Michaelson has devoted much of his ac-
ademic career to cementing a union between the 
distributional patterns of the modern welfare 
state and the federal constitution. Professor Karst 
would guarantee a whole range of nontextually 
based rights against government to ensure "the 
dignity of full membership in society," which, he 
asserts, inheres in the "right of equal citizenship." 
Professor Fiss argues that the courts should give 
"concrete meaning and application" to those val-
ues that "give our society an identity and inner 
coherence [and] its distinctive public morality." 
Professor Dworkin charges the courts with enforc-
ing our "constitutional morality," namely, the 
moral principles "presupposed by the law and in-
stitutions of the community." Professor Perry 
sees the court as having a "prophetic" role in de-
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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veloping moral standards in a "dialectical rela-
tionship" with congress, from which he sees 
emerging a "more mature" political morality. Pro-
fessor Richards urges that the court apply the 
contractarian moral theory of Professor Rawls' A 
Theory of Justice to constitutional questions. 
Professor Alfange tells us that the court should 
"translate . . . the national will into constitu-
tional terms." Professor White's urging that the 
courts invoke "reasons that appeal to deeply em-
bedded cultural values" is echoed in Professor 
Lupu's invitation that the court protect those 
fundamental values "that have a solid underpin-
ning in our historical traditions." Dean Sandalow 
describes constitutional law as "the means by 
which we express the values that we hold to be 
fundamental in the operations of government." 
Professor Brest summarizes the view of many 
when he states that "constitutional adjudication 
should enforce those ... values which are funda-
mental to our society." So doing, Professor Brest 
states, will "contribute to the well being of our so-
ciety-or more narrowly, to the ends of constitu-
tional government." So it goes. 
649 
That was from a discussion by Professor Monaghan for the non-
interpretive school criticizing the interpretive school. His own 
non-interpretive friends, I might add, are not necessarily easier 
to follow; although they do have the merit of simplicity-we 
judges are urged not to look beyond the words in the document, 
or in some cases, the words the drafters of the documents said 
elsewhere, but at least no further than the era in which the 
Framers of the constitution lived. 
All of this is by way of saying that I am not at all sure that 
the debate among the judicial review jurisprudentialists is really 
aimed at affecting the behavior of ordinary judges at all, al-
though they constantly talk about us, and of course every case 
that the Supreme Court eventually decides has to pass through 
one of our courts. 
Nonetheless, the quintessential judicial review question of 
whether something done by the executive or Congress or the 
state (not often for us because we live in that non-state, the Dis-
5
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trict of Columbia) violates the Constitution comes to us rarely. I 
venture to guess that out of 600 cases decided last year in our 
court, only a few (in fact I can think of only one or two last term 
and only three the term before) involved a serious frontal attack 
on the constitutionality of a congressional enactment or an exec-
utive action. And even though the Supreme Court grinds out 150 
or so opinions each term, it is interesting that most of the arti-
cles and books arguing about judicial review use as their conver-
sation pieces only a handful of cases: Brown v. Board,2 Roe v. 
Wade,3 the death penalty cases, Baker v. Carr,4 perhaps the 
school prayer and legislative veto cases, along with a few con-
trasts from the heyday of the 30s-Loehner/' Hammer v. Dag-
genhart,6 and Carter v. Carter Coal CO.7 The point is simple: 
constitutional cases for most federal judges are a rar-
ity-gourmet fare, definitely not the bread and butter of our 
everyday worklives. 
II 
My second point is that few judges I know reach out for or 
even want to decide constitutional issues. Such reticence does 
not stem from innate humility alone; but from a weary recogni-
tion that anytime you reverse some governmental action on con-
stitutional grounds, it almost inevitably means en bane review, 
or certiorari granted and probable reversal. The prognosis, of 
course, is quite different if you decide that challenged action is 
constitutional. I suggest there is institutionally and experien-. 
tially a very strong built-in bias in the lower courts against hold-
ing laws or actions violative of the federal constitution. I note 
that in the last two en banes our D.C. Circuit sent up there, in 
which we held warrantless search of closed containers in 
automobiles by police unconstitutional under the fourth amend-
mentS and congressional action allowing veterans organizations, 
2. 349 u.S. 294 (1955). 
3. 410 u.S. 113 (1973). 
4. 369 u.S. 186 (1962). 
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
6. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
7. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
8. Ross v. United States, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) rev'd, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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but no one else, unlimited use of tax deductible contributions 
for lobbying purposes unconstitutional under the equal protec-
tion clause,9 we were promptly reversed; the third one-striking 
down regulations prohibiting sleeping in Lafayette Park as part 
of a demonstration for homeless people has been granted certio-
rari, stayed, and a third reversal may be waiting in the wings.1o 
In over four years on the court, in my memory, except for a pig-
gyback on the legislative veto controversy, only once has a court 
in our circuit held a governmental action unconstitutional, and 
had that decision survive, and then only by a 4-4 vote because of 
Justice O'Connor's abstention. 
As a matter of fact, in last year's Supreme Court product I 
could find only six or so invalidations on constitutional grounds 
of state or federal laws (not including variations on the death 
penalty requirements and a few tax cases). And there were sev-
eral reversals of circuit court decisions holding state or federal 
laws unconstitutional. But it's worth taking a look at an exam-
ple in both categories in terms of our theories of judicial review. 
Marsh v. Chambers ll decided that the 200 year-old-practice 
of state legislatures paying chaplains for opening prayers was 
constitutional, although the Tenth Circuit, using the usual tests 
for establishment clause violations, had said it was not. Legisla-
tive prayers, the Court said, are "deeply embedded in the his-
tory and tradition of this country,"12 and the Framers who wrote 
the constitution contemporaneously voted to pay their chaplain. 
"Their actions revealed their intent."ls In response to the argu-
ment that this was the opening wedge, the Court emphasized 
that "the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability 
and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere 
shadow";14 no threat exists "while this Court sits."lli Justice 
Brennan was not so easily comforted. He pointed out that there 
was no attempt by the majority to justify this practice under 
9. Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) rev'd 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983). 
10. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
cert. granted 104 S. Ct. 65 (1983). 
11. 51 U.S.L.W. 5162 (1983). 
12. [d. at 5163. 
13. [d. at 5164. 
14. [d. at 5165. 
15. [d. 
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ordinary tests for establishment clause violations: it merely 
carved out an historical exception to the first amendment prohi-
bition. He questioned the assumption the Framers wouldn't 
have authorized inconsistent practices: 
Legislators influenced by the passions and exigen-
cies of the moment, the pressures of constituents 
and colleagues, and the press of business, do not 
always pass sober constitutional judgment on 
every piece of legislation they enact, and this 
must be assumed to be as true of the members of 
the First Congress as any other. IS 
I guess this is a noninterpretive decision-or is it? I don't 
think it's textual. Justice Brennan doesn't seem to place as 
much faith in the legislature as Dean Ely. Maybe the Court 
shouldn't have taken it at all, since it was a political question. 
My own reaction is everyone wanted the question settled once 
and for all, and now it is. Most people knew how it would come 
out, and they're relieved. . 
Now let's compare a case where the Supreme Court did 
overturn a law: the legislative veto case. Chief Justice Burger be-
gan with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid.17 
"Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts"lS-but "by the 
same token, the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, 
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, 
standing alone, will not save it."19 (Since 1932, 295 congressional 
vetoes have been inserted into 195 statutes.) The opinion's anal-
ysis is primarily textual-all legislation must be passed by both 
Houses and presented to the President. It was the Congress' ar-
bitrary use of the legislative power that gave rise to the device of 
the presidential veto. Bicameralism was another check on that 
power. "Art. 1, sec. 7 represents the Framers' decision that the 
legislative power . . . be exercised in accord with a single finely 
16. [d. at 5170-71. 
17. I.N.S. v. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). 
18. [d. at 2780. 
19. [d. at 2780-81. 
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wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. "20 Recognizing, 
however, that not "every action taken by either House [is] sub-
ject to the bicameralism and requirements of Article I, whether 
actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exercise of 
legislative power, depends not on their form but upon whether 
they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legisla-
tive in its character and effect."21 Finding the action in Chadha 
to be essentially legislative, the result came easily. When the 
Framers wanted to permit one House to act alone, as in im-
peachment, confirmation, and ratification, it said so. 
So, based on the limited sample of one term, why does the 
Court invoke judicial veto when it does, and vice versa. Except 
for legislative veto-brewing for years in the courts-the in-
stances are very circumscribed where the veto wipes out a legis-
lative enactment. A church veto over taverns in Massachusetts; 
demonstrating on the Supreme Court sidewalk; requiring I.D. 
from suspicious persons in California-not very heady constitu-
tional stuff. The abortion cases this year present a special situa-
tion. Basically the Court was policing: it went through a series of 
state and local restrictions laid down on exercise of the basic 
right it reaffirmed for a woman and her doctor to agree whether 
to terminate a pregnancy; upheld some as permissible, de-
nounced some as imposing an impermissibly heavy burden on 
the exercise of the basic right. Historically there are about one 
and a half cases a term that turn constitutional scholars on. This 
year it was the legislative veto case. 
And make no mistake-it was a bonzo. It will take years to 
dig out of the ashes. That was a constitutional confrontation. 
Was the Court right? Should it have decided the case-a separa-
tion of powers case? I think it had to-a variety of laws affecting 
all sorts of people depended on a yes or no answer. Maybe there 
was no process deficiency-how could there be, given the infinite 
variety of matters involved in hundreds of legislative vetoes-no 
insular minority-but there was a three decades' long conflict 
between the two major branches of government simmering. 
Surely it could not have been fought out on the streets, or with 
United States Marshals, or with infinite inaction. In any society 
20. [d. at 2784. 
21. [d. 
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as complicated and varied as ours, there must be an um-
pire-preferably one accepted by the bulk of parties and people. 
We cannot keep moving unless there is one. Hence, I have a gut 
skepticism that judicial review really can or should be contained 
by narrow theories, most of which are incomprehensible to the 
judges. Like chaplains, we are "part of the fabric of our soci-
ety."22 As I perceive it, we have no rampant campaign to over-
turn state or federal laws passed by legislatures: quite the oppo-
site. Courts are remarkably political, in the lower capital sense 
of the word. When such a danger presents itself-as in the 
30's-the chances are politics will triumph. Meanwhile, the 
translation process of the jurisprudential theories into our daily 
work is difficult if not impossible. Pragmatist that I am, I doubt 
if judicial review really can be limited to process deficiencies, or 
insular minorities, or even civil rights. We need the third 
branch-underpaid, beholden to none, occasionally out of touch, 
but always independent to cool a hyped-up society in its hottest 
disputes. It's silly to pretend otherwise-there's no place else to 
go. 
III 
This is not, however, to say that our only contact with con-
stitutional issues in judicial review comes by way of such rare 
direct challenges. 
There is an intermediate group of cases-not large, but not 
insignificant-where lower federal courts, confronted with the 
potential of a possibly serious constitutional question, em-
ploy-as indeed, we have been instructed to-time-honored di-
versionary techniques to prevent head-on constitutional colli-
sions. We decide non-constitutional questions first, so that we 
may never have to reach the constitutional ones. The judge's no-
tion of whether there is a serious constitutional question present 
and what form it takes, of course, colors her judgment on the 
statutory construction. Now, most of us legal realists recognize 
that in so doing we are making implicit-sometimes ex-
22. Marsh v. Chambers, 51 U.S.L.W. 5164. 
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plicit-constitutional judgments about what that document will 
or will not tolerate, in order to interpret the statute to avoid the 
constitutional question. Thus, through the back door, we make a 
pass at more constitutional questions than it may appear. But 
the rules under which we operate when we are on our constitu-
tional avoidance track are different from the conflicting themes 
of constitutional adjudication so hotly debated in articles and 
seminars. 
Thus, the way in which we most often address fundamental 
constitutional rights is through statutory construction. In this 
way, our perceptions of fundamental rights and values are in-
fused into our statutory interpretations, rather than made the 
centerpiece of explicit constitutional decisions. But other facets 
of the judicial review debate are muted in this context: the legit-
imacy of judicial review at all, the separation of powers problems 
inherent in it, the strength of presumptions of legislative valid-
ity, hierarchies of values, insular minorities, and the Carolene 
Products footnote. 23 In passing on the interpretation rather than 
the validity per se of congressional enactments, we are cosmeti-
cally allied with Congress-enforcing its intent, not challenging 
its constitutional judgment. And we have been entrusted with 
the power of reviewing enforcement of its enactment by Con-
gress itself. We are its designated agent, not an interloper. We 
are engaged in a search for its intent, and under prevailing rules 
of statutory construction, confined in that search to the words 
that came out of its collective mouth: in hearings, committee re-
ports, floor debates. Unlike the explorers of constitutional law, 
we are not ordinarily allowed to run at will, foraying into the 
Framers' private letters, newspapers of the times, and even con-
temporary eighteenth century thinkers in other lands. But still 
we construe in the shadow of the Constitution and that shadow 
can often account for the tilt that throws our construction one 
way or the other. 
So constitutional shadows put a thumb on the scale in favor 
of a construction avoiding the question. Whether that rule of 
statutory construction can or is being carried too far is another 
question. Why, after all, should courts avoid legitimate constitu-
tional questions through this device, if it means skewering true 
23. 304 u.s. at 152-53 nA. 
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legislative intent? 
Whether a decision involving an important or even "funda-
mental" right arises in or is decided by statutory construction or 
constitutional adjudication seems to be a function of the law-
yer's tactical judgment, the clarity, or even governmental level of 
the legislative response which may, in turn, reflect the status of 
the issue in the national agenda or in the agenda of the political 
groups to which the political branches respond. It can-at least 
at the Supreme Court level-also turn on the Court's choice of 
responses-whether it wishes to turn from the constitutional is-
sue and take refuge in a presumption of statutory construction 
or bite the constitutional bullet. Lower federal courts, I believe, 
generally hold back more from the constitutional course. 
IV 
What has all this to do with Professors Ely's and Choper's 
themes on judicial review? For one thing, federal courts, at least, 
strike down relatively few actions as unconstitutional but, when 
they do, they are more apt to be executive than legislative ac-
tions. Executive actions, in my experience, tend to be less di-
rectly representative than those of Congress; executive decisions 
reflect more bureaucratic input. Hence, we in the courts may be 
less representation-enforcing even when we do declare actions of 
the political branches unconstitutional than would first appear. 
Second, most of the cases where we do perform constitu-
tional adjudication do not involve declaration of new 
rights-those decades may indeed be gone forever-the right to 
an abortion, to one person one vote, to desegregate schools. 
Rather, they involve constitutional balancing, deciding whether 
the burden placed on the exercise of some right or power is justi-
fied by the strength of the interest asserted by the legislative or 
executive branch. The questions that must be answered in the 
balancing cases include: How heavy or light is the burden? If it 
is light or trivial, stay on square one. If it is heavy, go on to 
square two. How strong or weak is the state interest asserted to 
justify the burden? How important in the rights' hierarchy is the 
right or interest being burdened? The value judgments come in 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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answering those questions about heavy and light, very important 
or only somewhat important. And, to be honest, the Supreme 
Court (and other judges) do appear to use a wide range of 
sources, including newspapers, undocumented assertions, his-
tory, sociology, common sense, medical lore, statistics, law re-
views, almost anything printable, in making those qualitative 
decisions. 
This is not to say that concerns about judges overruling 
majoritarian decisions do not apply to such decisions. In overrul-
ing a legislative or executive action because it places too heavy a 
burden on a right, the Court is redoing a balance the other 
branch presumably has already done. And when the decisions on 
what is heavy, light, strong, or weak come from a potpourri of 
informational sources, there will always be doubt that the judges 
can do a better job of weighing them than the popularly elected 
branches. Conceivably, they may do a less biased or more honest 
weighing job, but certainly they have no inherent claim to com-
petence in such scaling. Yet, this is the way the Supreme Court 
has told us to do the job, and certainly if we look at the way 
they do it, I agree it's not always reassuring. This year's abortion 
cases are a classic illustration. The basic right to an abortion had 
been declared long since, and that decision, the Court said, 
would not be revisited. 
Rather, what the Court had to decide was whether a wide 
variety of state and local government responses attempting to 
restrict and control the right went too far constitutionally in 
burdening it. Among the regulations challenged were ones re-
quiring hospitalization after the first trimester, notification and 
consent by parents for unmarried minors, that the physician tell 
the patient certain specified things including that the fetus is a 
human being, that the unborn child may be viable, that abortion 
is a major surgical procedure and may result in severe emotional 
disturbance, a twenty-four-hour waiting period requirement, and 
a requirement that fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane" 
manner. Violations were criminally punishable. 
One gets the distinct feeling from reading Justice Powell's 
majority decision that the Court sensed that many of these re-
strictions were enacted in order to erode or even wipe out alto-
gether the basic right. In that sense, it may have been a case of 
13
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disingenuous legislation akin to strategems and weaseling on ba-
sic rights to erode school desegregation policies in the early civil 
rights days of the 60's. Even if we are dealing with women, not 
blacks, in abortion cases, and women have access to the political 
process; still something sticks in the gut about presuming the 
legislature has gone about its balancing conscientiously when the 
results cry no. And indeed the Court was not particularly defer-
ential in these cases to the legislative balance. 
Several of the restrictions were struck down on what seems 
to be a basis of common sense, common knowledge, accepted (in 
some quarters) dogma; conversely, the dissents' howls of anguish 
seemed equally based on individual preconceptions of how the 
world works and how people and institutions will react. Neither 
side offered any empirical proof of their assumptions. 
In our court recently, we had to decide if restrictions on 
signs five or ten feet, upheld by aluminum tubing, unduly bur-
dened the acknowledged right to demonstrate in front of the 
White House. Were it to be left entirely to legislative or execu-
tive discretion, a cumulation of such restrictions could at some 
point make the right worthless-common sense tells us that. So 
courts are left to do the eternal balancing act. My trouble with 
the thrust of the representation reinforcement limitation is that 
it forces courts to sit by and watch a hostile legislature or execu-
tive do away with a constitutionally declared right through the 
device of restrictions. 
COMMENTS 
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Wisconsin Supreme Court 
I'm delighted to participate on this panel. Ordinarily, in in-
terpreting writings like constitutional or statutory provisions or 
appellate opinions, we have to guess at the Framers' intent. We 
have with us today two framers, and they can set forth their own 
intent. I think they must know how it feels to be interpreted 
since they have been so well reviewed and discussed. I wonder if 
they say to friends, as an appellate court judge sometimes says 
from the bench, "Did I say that?" 
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I originally thought of coming up and saying, as Dean Ely 
and perhaps Dean Choper hinted (or maybe they did more than 
hint), that perhaps their works and this discussion have no value 
for state court judges, other than as an interesting intellectual 
exercise. But Judge Patel would be disappointed with such a re-
sponse, and I thought the messages of these two deans have 
meaning to more judges than just those on the United States 
Supreme Court. 
So I decided that I would give this more thought. I spent 
$28.50 for Choper's book, $6.95 for Ely's book, and I, like Judge 
Wald, xeroxed and read many, many pages of reviews and arti-
cles by scholars in the field of judicial review. As I read, I still 
had the uncomfortable feeling that maybe this panel was not the 
forum for a state judge. But a newspaper piece I read put the 
two books into a special perspective. 
Since I'm a populist, I always read the local newspa-
pers-especially when they're delivered free of charge to the ho-
tel room. A letter to the editor in yesterday's San Francisco 
Chronicle raises the issue that the academy raises as to judicial 
review, that is, the legitimacy of court action which appears to 
be counter-majoritarian. But the letter raises the issue not in the 
olympian field in which our two academicians write, namely ju-
dicial review under the federal Constitution by the highest court 
of the United States, but in the everyday workings of a state 
court interpreting state statutes. I read the letter (which some of 
you may have read) not in terms of the merits of the case dis-
cussed by the letter writer, but as an example of a lay per-
son's-I assume it's a lay person's-discussion of the issue of le-
gitimacy of judicial decision making. 
The letter is entitled, "A Just Society?" It reads as follows: 
In a just society, where the courts bowed to the 
will of the people [I think that's a reference to 
majoritarianism] Archie Fain would not be al-
lowed to walk the streets as a free man. He would 
either be put in the gas chamber or he would face 
life imprisonment. 
In a just society-
The letter writer doesn't refer to our society as "democratic" as 
the academicians do. Lay people talk about a just society. I do 
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not think the word "just" appears often in the two books we are 
talking about today. To continue with the letter: 
In a just society, 62,000 people signing a peti-
tion to keep this convicted murderer in prison 
would have an effect on the courts. But not in this 
case, where the justices have ruled that 'public 
outcry' is not sufficient reason to keep Fain in jail. 
In a just society, the governor of California, 
acting on executive privilege and with the will of 
the people in mind, would be allowed to rescind 
Fain's parole without interference by courts. 
Fain's release is the worst miscarriage of jus-
tice and the democratic process I've ever 
experienced.24 
The letter is an interesting commentary on what the writer 
perceives as the judiciary functioning in a counter-majoritarian 
way, a commentary not from an academician, not from a judge, 
but from a representative of the people whom the judicial sys-
tem serves. Now, we could discuss, but I won't, the merits of the 
Fain case, the procedural posture of the case, and the rules of 
statutory construction. The letter, however, raises a broader 
question, for all of us, whether we be at the first level of a trial 
court, at an intermediate appellate court, or at'the highest court 
of the state or federal system. It is the question which I believe 
underlies the Ely and Choper works: How do we judge, and what 
is the legitimacy of our actions? 
These two books concerning legitimacy of judicial action are 
directed, unlike the letter, at judicial review by the United 
States Supreme Court. Constitutional interpretation and the le-
gitimacy of judicial review appear to come into vogue in aca-
demic discussions every twenty years or so. As we again question 
the concept of judicial review in the 1980's and are concerned 
about the power of the judiciary in this country, it is interesting 
to note that our European colleagues are turning more and more 
to the judiciary and to the adoption of judicial review. 
24. San Francisco Chronicle. Oct. 8 1983. at 32. col. 4. 
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Let me tell you why I think the two books, at one and the 
same time, do and don't have something to say to the state 
judge in her everyday world of judging. 
The two authors pose the question of the legitimacy of judi-
cial review in a democratic society on the grounds that judges 
are not elected representatives of the people, and that judicial 
decisions are final. These themes do not apply to many state 
courts since, first, many state judges are elected and, second, 
generally our decisions are not final. 
I am a judge, elected statewide on a contested, nonpartisan 
ballot. One can argue that I am a representative of the people. I, 
like the legislator, come to office with a mandate from the peo-
ple. This reasoning is not totally satisfactory. The nature of the 
commitment I made when running for election differs from that 
of the legislator. I did not promise, like a legislative candidate, 
to support any group or any group's wishes in deciding an issue 
that comes before the judiciary. I did not in my campaign ex-
plain my personal views on issues pending before the court or 
the state, or explain my personal value system. I made a promise 
to the people of the state that I would be a good judge; I prom-
ised I would be fair and would administer justice impartially; I 
would obey and abide by and support the federal and state con-
stitutions. Running for election I sounded very much the way a 
nominee for a federal judgeship sounds in a Senate confirmation 
hearing. I promised to interpret the law and abide by the 
majoritarian view expressed in the statute unless contrary to the 
Constitution. I promised to interpret the constitutions as written 
and to abide by the doctrine of stare decisis. Although many 
have commented that the legislative process is not an expression 
of majority will, I cannot cast myself as a representative of the 
people, as can a legislator who has run on a platform which the 
people evaluate and review in terms of the legislator's individual 
decisions on the merits of an issue. 
Second, state court decisions are rarely final-not even the 
decisions of the highest court of the state are necessarily final. 
As long as the court is not final, according to the Ely-Choper 
theses, the majoritarian democratic process can work. The court 
may slow things down awhile, but the majority can still act to 
overrule the court. 
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As to the federal Constitution, I as a state court judge do, of 
course, interpret the federal Constitution. State court decisions 
on federal questions are not final-but they are important. Al-
though it is popular to think that the United States Supreme 
Court is protecting individual rights via the federal Constitution, 
you know that trial judges, state and federal, protect individual 
rights every day. State and federal judges deal with search 'and 
seizure, as an example, much more frequently than does the 
United States Supreme Court. The state courts touch the lives 
of more people a day than the United States Supreme Court 
does in the 150 to 200 cases it hears in a year. 
As to the state constitution, our state court might very well 
be the court of last resort. I might be final if the United States 
Supreme Court really believes me when I write that I'm inter-
preting the state constitution, and the Court does not view me 
as being devious and trying to avoid its review. In any event, 
even if the state supreme court is final in its interpretation of 
the state constitution, in many states, the people, by majority 
rule, can overrule the court decision. 
The major part of the state judge's job is to interpret and 
apply state laws. It is my job to interpret state statutes, not 
make state policy. The legislature sets forth the policy, I fill in 
the cracks. Sometimes the cracks are large, sometimes they're 
small. But in any event, the legislature can change the "fillings." 
As to the common law, judge-made law, judges have broad 
authority. And yet we're reviewable and reversible by the state 
legislature. 
In Choper and Ely terms, we state judges are not counter-
majoritarian because our decisions for the most part can be 
changed, at least for future cases, by the majority acting through 
the legislature. 
I suggest, however, as Judge Wald did, that although it's in-
teresting to look at the concept of judicial review in terms of a 
court striking down, with finality, legislative and executive en-
actments on grounds of unconstitutionality-it's a very dramatic 
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event when the court strikes down the work of another 
branch-this function of the courts has been stressed too much. 
Invalidation of laws is the rare event, not the common event. 
Thousands of laws are passed each year. Most of them are never 
reviewed by any court; if they're reviewed, most of them are not 
invalidated. We have also overemphasized the idea that the judi-
cial decision is final. Studies show that even if a law is invali-
dated, the judicial decision declaring invalidity is not necessarily 
final. Courts have been known to overrule earlier decisions. 
There are a variety of ways a legislature may get around the 
court's decision. An interesting article by Professor Janet S. 
Lindgren in the Wisconsin Law Review2fJ reports a study of the 
interaction of the courts and the legislature in New York State 
at the turn of the century. Professor Lindgren concludes that 
the courts' overturning of state legislation was not generally a 
final answer but was part of a dialogue between the court and 
the legislature. The legislature continued to pass laws to see 
what the dialogue would bring. 
Although the Deans' discussions of the legitimacy of judicial 
review on the basis of the nonrepresentative character of the 
courts and the finality of judicial decisions have limited applica-
bility to state judges (and may be challenged even as applied to 
federal judges), these authors nevertheless have something im-
portant to tell state judges in helping us decide our day-to-day 
cases. 
We judges must recognize that every case is potentially one 
of law reform and law revision and every litigation is, in a sense, 
counter-majoritarian whether it's before an elected or an ap-
pointed judge. The judge, often without specific direction from 
the legislature or prior case law, and always without discussion 
with the people or the people's representatives, is making a deci-
sion binding on the parties and others who are not before the 
court. I spoke previously about the court's task of filling in the 
legislative cracks. Dean Ely objects to legislative delegation to 
administrative agencies. He thinks the people should hold the 
legislature's feet to the fire and make the democratically elected 
branch of government set forth legislative policy in greater de-
25. Lindgren, Beyond Cases: Reconsidering Judicial Review, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 583 
(1983). 
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tail in legislative enactments. I suggest that after you deal with 
enough legislation as a state court judge, you realize that the 
legislature has frequently delegated the establishment of policy 
without adequate guidelines not only to the administrative agen-
cies but also to the courts. The legislature, unable to make up its 
mind about key facets of the law or unable to muster a majority 
either for or against a particular provision, omits a key provision 
or leaves it ambiguous, thus delegating to state judges the task 
of making policy in the guise of filling in the legislative cracks. 
What principles guide the judge's interpretation of the statute 
or common law or the application of the law to the facts? 
Deans Ely and Choper caution us, and especially Dean Ely 
tells us, that as judges we should not use our own personal value 
system, our own personal predilections, in reaching our deci-
sions. I agree. But it is easy to say that the judge should not 
decide cases following her own sense of justice. It is easy to say 
that the judge should not decide cases following what she be-
lieves is the popular view, except as the popular view may be 
expressed by a jury instructed on the law by a judge. You will all 
remember reading about a judge disciplined because he decided 
cases on the basis of how the court-watchers seated in the court-
room voted on the case. The judge cannot be guided by the re-
sults of an opinion poll. In talking to the citizens of my state, I 
have not found -anyone who wants me to decide any case accord-
ing to popular community wisdom. 
What is the judge to do when an agency or the chief execu-
tive acts in a manner that is very popular but contrary to the 
statutes or constitution? Each of us knows how often we have 
had to say: "I do not like the result I am reaching, but the stat-
ute or the constitution adopted by the people or their represent-
atives requires that I so hold." The judge is at one and the same 
time independent of the people and accountable to the people. 
The judge's obligation is to decide cases according to princi-
ples generally and consistently applied. Defining these principles 
is not easy. Deans Ely and Choper attempt to set forth general 
principles to guide the United States Supreme Court in making 
decisions, but the principles are not yet well enough developed, 
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and they offer little guidance in deciding the actual cases that 
come before the court. 
We struggle to analyze the elements of decision making and 
to improve the decision-making process and the judgments ren-
dered. We can devise the best system and have the best set of 
laws and principles, but the quality of justice depends ultimately 
on the quality of the women and men who sit as judges. I under-
stand the Deans to be telling us that our decision making should 
not be based on our personal value system but on our sense of 
an institutional value system. In deciding cases we judges must 
be sensitive to the issues the Deans have raised-to the awesome 
responsibility imposed on the judiciary; to our nonrepresentative 
character; to the degree of finality of our decisions; to the impor-
tance of the independence of the judiciary working in a system 
of democratic, majoritarian rule; and to the basic constitutional 
concepts of protecting the minority in a pluralistic society and of 
protecting the majority against the tyranny of the minority. It's 
a big order for each of us to fill every day in every case. But I am 
confident we shall try to fill it. 
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